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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates the performance of the Arab GCC banking industry in the context 
of the Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis in the period 1993-2002. The paper 
uses panel estimation differentiating between bank fixed effects and country fixed 
effects. It examines the Relative-Market-Power and the Efficient-Structure hypotheses 
differentiating between the two by employing a non-parametric measure of technical 
efficiency, and finds that the banking industry in the Arab GCC countries is best 
explained by the mainstream SCP hypothesis. The empirical results do not find any 
support for the Hicks (1935) “Quiet Life” version of the market power hypothesis.  
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1 Introduction 
Numerous studies have found a positive relationship between market structure and firm 
profitability. While there is general acceptance of the empirical relationship there is no 
consensus as to the causation. The relationship between market structure and 
performance is viewed from two competing hypothesis: The Market Power Hypotheses 
in the form of Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) and Relative-Market-Power 
(RMP), and the Efficient-Structure (ES) hypotheses in the form of X-efficiency or Scale 
efficiency. This paper examines the profit-structure relationship in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council’s (GCC)1 banking industry over the period 1993-2002.  
This paper has three objectives. First, to assess the relevance of the Structure-
Conduct-Performance (SCP), the Relative-Market-Power (RMP) and the Efficient-
Structure (ES) hypotheses in the GCC banking industry. Second, to examine the 
evidence for the Hicks (1935) Quiet Life Hypothesis (QL). Third, to fill a gap in the 
empirical literature applied to this geographic area. 
The paper is structured into five sections. Section 2 discusses the degree of 
banking market concentration in each of the GCC countries and provides an overview 
of the literature on the performance-market structure relationship. Section 3 details the 
methodological framework and presents the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
findings and section 5 concludes 
 
2 GCC Banking and Literature Review  
The most frequently used measure of market structure is the 3-firm deposits 
concentration ratio and the second most frequently used is the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI)2. We present both indices in measuring market concentration in Table 1 
                                                 
1 The Arab GCC countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
2 See Molyneux et al (1996) 
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below for 1995 and 2002. It reveals that GCC banking industries are characterised by 
high market concentration. In 2002, the three largest banks in Kuwait accounted for 62 
per cent of total commercial banking sector deposits, whereas in the least concentrated 
market, the UAE, the top three held 44 per cent share of banking sector deposits. The 
Qatari banking sector was also highly concentrated, with a three-firm concentration 
ratio of 81 per cent. Saudi Arabia’s three largest banks accounted for 51 per cent of the 
domestic banking sector. The three largest banks in Oman and Bahrain accounted for  
81 per cent and 79 per cent, respectively. Overall, the high degree of concentration in 
GCC banking markets suggests that the strict licensing rules and restrictions on foreign 
bank entry have helped create these market structures. It can be seen that the UAE has 
the lowest level of concentration and this is almost certainly a consequence of less 
stringent restrictions on the licensing of domestic and foreign banks that have increased 
in number, especially in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
 
Table 1: Trends in Concentration in the Deposits Market 
Country Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Year  CR3 HHI CR3 HHI CR3 HHI CR3 HHI CR3 HHI CR3 HHI 
2002 0.79 2351 0.62 1897 0.81 2712 0.81 3565 0.51 1298 0.44 1064
1995 0.83 2738 0.61 1983 0.77 2258 0.81 3995 0.54 1468 0.53 1299
Source: Annual Reports 
The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis of Bain (1951) may be 
summed up as markets characterised by a structure with relatively few firms and high 
barriers to entry will conduct pricing aimed at achieving joint profit maximisation 
through collusion, price leadership, or other tacit pricing arrangements. This type of 
price conduct should in turn yield profits and prices that are greater than the competitive 
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norm3. Our expectation based on table 1 is that a measure of concentration will be 
positively related to profit. A related theory is the Relative-Market-Power Hypothesis 
(RMP), which asserts that only firms with large market shares and well-differentiated 
products are able to exercise market power and earn supernormal profits (see Shepherd 
1982). 
The Quiet Life Hypothesis (QL) of Hicks (1935) posits that firms with greater 
market power may take advantage of the gains from non-competitive pricing in a more 
relaxed environment in which less effort is put into the rigours of minimising cost. The 
“Quiet Life Hypothesis” is not a necessary part of the market power paradigm, but is 
often included in it (see Shepherd 1979). Berger and Hannan (1995) found that quiet life 
effects in banking appeared to be several times larger than social losses associated with 
the mispricing of products from market power4. If the quiet life hypothesis holds, then 
the positive profit-structure relationship is partially offset by cost increases from poorer 
cost efficiency which may explain why the profit-structure relationship is so weak in 
many banking papers (see the survey by Gilbert, 1984). It could also help explain why 
prices tend to be much more strongly related to concentration than profits. 
An alternative hypothesis is the efficient-structure (ES) hypothesis that emerges 
from criticism of the SCP hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973 and Peltzman, 1977).  The 
efficiency hypothesis postulates that the relationship between market structure and 
performance of any firm is defined by the efficiency of the firm. Firms with superior 
management or production technologies have lower costs and therefore higher profits.  
                                                 
3 In his review of 45 studies on the relationship between performance and market structure in the banking industry, Gilbert (1984) 
concluded that about half of the studies uncovered a statistically significant relationship between performance and market structure 
and the numerical impact of concentration was minor. 
 
4 Failure to account for the possibility of quiet life effects may lead to biased coefficients in testing the efficient-structure condition 
that efficiency increases concentration and market share, see Berger and Hannan (1997).  
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The ES hypothesis has been usually proposed in two different forms, depending 
on the type of efficiency considered. In the X-efficiency form, more efficient firms have 
lower costs, higher profits and larger market share, because they have a superior ability 
in minimising costs to produce any given outputs. In the Scale Efficiency form, the same 
relationship described above is due to the fact that more scale efficient firms produce 
closer to the minimum average-cost point.  
SCP studies of banking generally can be divided into two groups according to 
the measure of performance used. The first group uses some measure of the price of 
particular banking products and services in order to capture the performance of the firm, 
while the second uses a profitability measure, such as return on assets or return on 
equity. However, using the price of a single banking product as a measure of 
performance may be misleading because of the multi-product nature of a bank’s output5. 
Profit measures may be more informative, but may also be more difficult to interpret 
because of the complexity of the accounting procedures involved. Molyneux and Forbes 
(1995) emphasize that profitability measures, where all product profit and losses are 
consolidated into one figure, are generally viewed as more suitable because they by-
pass the problem of cross subsidisation.  
Evanoff and Fortier (1988) suggest a number of reasons why the ROA measure 
is preferable to other profit measures. Firstly, although some studies have used bank 
product prices as the dependent variable, banking is a multi-product business and 
individual prices may be misleading. Prices can only be used if costs directly associated 
with these prices are explicitly accounted for as explanatory variables. Secondly, the 
potential for significant cross subsidisation between products obviously exists and 
                                                 
5 See Goddard et al (2001) 
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pricing strategy will differ across markets. The use of a profit measures eliminates many 
of these problems and ROA has been used extensively in the literature6.  
Four approaches have been taken in distinguishing between the competing 
hypotheses7. The first approach explains profits in terms of market structure variables 
such as concentration and market share. The usual finding is a positive statistically 
significant coefficient of market share, and a statistically insignificant coefficient of 
concentration. Some argue that this finding supports the efficient-structure hypothesis, 
since both market share and profits are correlated with efficiency, which is excluded 
from this empirical specification (e.g. Smirlock, Gilligan, and Marshall, 1984, 1986); 
and Smirlock, 1985). However, this result is observationally equivalent to the RMP 
hypothesis, since firms with larger shares can exercise greater market power and earn 
higher profits (Shepherd, 1986).  
The second approach attempts to solve the observational equivalence problem 
by adding independent measures of efficiency to the profits equation. If efficiency is 
properly controlled for, then market share or concentration should reflect only market 
power effects8.  
The third approach has used survey information on the prices of individual bank 
deposit and loan products (e.g. Berger and Hannan, 1989, 1997; and Hannan 1991) and 
regress these against the market structure variables to test the market-power hypotheses. 
A finding of less favourable prices for consumers (lower deposit rates or higher loan 
rates) in concentrated markets is taken as support for the market-power hypotheses. An 
                                                 
6 For example, Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Molyneux and Forbes (1995), Berger (1995), and 
Goldberg and Rai (1996). 
7 Berger and Hannan (1997) 
8 Studies that have included proxies for scale efficiency include Shepherd (1982); and Allen and Hagin, 
(1989). Whereas Timme and Yang (1991) and Berger (1995) have included direct measures of technical 
efficiency. 
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advantage of this approach is that the exact prices paid or received are more accurate 
indicators of market power than are profits.  
The fourth approach directly relates market structure to efficiency. 
Concentration and market share are regressed on the efficiency measures to test the 
efficient-structure condition that efficiency creates greater concentration or market share 
(see Berger, 1995; and Berger and Hannan, 1997). If the positive relationship between 
performance and structure is not spurious in the ES hypothesis, efficiency must be 
positively related to both performance and structure. The problem with this approach is 
that causation may also flow in the opposite direction, with market structure affecting 
efficiency. Under the market-power hypotheses, market structure is associated with 
market power, and firms may take some of the benefits of this power as a more relaxed 
environment in which there is less pressure to maximise efficiency. Under this `quiet 
life' addendum to the market-power hypotheses, higher concentration and market share 
will be negatively related to efficiency, giving a downward bias to the coefficients when 
the market structure variables are regressed on the efficiency variables.  
In summary the majority of existing studies employ a single-equation model of 
bank profitability where a measure of profit rate is explained by a measure of market 
concentration, along with control variables. Substantial disagreement still remains 
concerning the role of market concentration on bank profitability. Principally, the 
disagreement is about interpretation. Does a positive effect of concentration on profits 
suggest relative market power or relative market efficiency? Existing studies provide a 
valuable procedural and methodological road map for future studies on the 
concentration-profitability issue. However, no such study exists for the GCC countries. 
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3 Methodology and data. 
We follow closely the methodology of Berger and Hannan (1997) in testing the 
relationship between market structure and bank performance.  The basic model can be 
expressed as  
  tjitjijtjjtjiitji ZXB ,,,,,,,0,, εγβααπ ++++=    (1) 
Where tji ,,π  represents the measure of performance for bank i in country j at time t; 
tjiB ,,  are bank specific variables for bank i in country j at time t; tjX , are country 
variables for country j at time t; tjiZ ,,  represents market structure variables of bank i in 
country j.  
 Two measures of profitability are used in the literature; Return on Assets (ROA) 
and Return on Equity (ROE). ROA reflects management’s ability to utilise the bank’s 
financial and real investment resources to generate profits, specifically, it measures the 
profit earned per currency of assets. This ratio depends mainly on the bank’s policy as 
well as some external factors related to the economy and government regulations. ROE 
reflects the effectiveness of management in utilising shareholders’ funds. In this study 
we concentrate on ROA as the results for ROE are qualitatively similar. 
 Independent measures of efficiency are obtained from the non-parametric 
methods of Charnes et al. (1978) and Banker et al. (1984). Best-practice banks form the 
efficient frontier and are technically efficient. For each bank outside the frontier, a 
technical efficiency score relates its position to the best-practice peer bank.  
Table 2 below describes the modelling framework of Berger and Hannan (1997). 
Model 1 describes the first approach which tests the positive relationship between 
market structure and profitability, ROA is regressed on market shares and market 
concentration and bank and economy specific variables, whilst efficiency measures are 
not directly considered. Model 2 describes the second approach and includes efficiency 
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measures as response variables. Model 3 describes the fourth approach of explaining the 
market structure measures. In addition, Model 4 includes the version of Hicks’ (1935) 
“Quiet life” hypothesis proposed by Berger and Hannan (1997). We also consider two 
efficiency measures - Technical Efficiency and Scale Efficiency. The ES hypotheses 
can be stated in two different versions. In the technical efficiency version, higher profits 
and larger market shares are determined by superior skills in transforming input-
quantities in output-quantities. In the scale efficiency version, profits and market share 
come from lower costs determined by an optimal operational scale. 
Table 2: Models of market structure and profitability 
Model Approach Dep. Variable Explanatory variables 
1 1st ROA CR3, MS, B and X variables* 
2 2nd ROA CR3, MS, T-EFF, S-EFF, B and X variables 
3 4th CR3/MS T-EFF, B and X variables 
4 QLH T-EFF, S-EFF MS, CR3, B and X variables 
ROA 
CR3 
MS 
Te-EFF 
S-EFF 
DEPGRW 
ASSET 
 
CAPAST 
 
 
LOANAST 
 
DDTTDEP 
 
TEXPTA 
 
POPBRANCH 
 
OBSTA 
 
SPECIALIZ 
GDPPC 
Net after tax return on assets. 
Highest three banks in the deposit market of each country. 
Deposit market share per country 
Technical efficiency score in input orientation (all GCC banks) 
Scale efficiency  score 
Economy deposit growth as a proxy for market growth  
Bank total assets (millions) in $s as a measure of bank size and 
economies of scale. 
The ratio of capital to assets is a proxy for financial strength. The 
higher the capital-asset ratio the higher must ROA be for a given 
required return on equity.   
The ratio of loan to assets as a proxy for risk. The higher is risk the 
higher is ROA as a compensating effect.                  
Ratio of demand deposits to total deposits as a proxy for liquid 
liabilities.  
Ratio of total expenses to total assets as a measure of operating 
costs. 
The ratio of population per branch as a proxy for geographic 
diversification. 
Ratio of off-balance sheet income to total income as a proxy for 
business diversification. 
Dummy variable for Islamic bank 
Per capita income in $ as a proxy for local market conditions. 
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 The data comprises 52 banks within the GCC economies over the period 1993-
2002 for 5 countries and 1995-2002 for UAE. The data for the banks were collected 
from the respective annual statements. Table 3 summarises the data used in the analysis. 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean  Std. Dev Min  Max 
ROA .0175 .0159 -.1200 .0700 
ASSET $ mill 4099.5 4912.2 195.1 28477.8 
CR3 .6213 .1334 .430 .840 
MS .1203 .1102 0.0 0.6 
DEPGRW .0920 .0729 -.01 .45 
CAPAST .1326 .0597 -.03 .44 
LOANAST .5374 .1876 .060 .920 
DDTTDEP .2688 .2106 .040 .990 
TEXPTA .0508 .0159 .02 .22 
POPBRANCH 12226.3 3020.6 8021 18873 
OBSTA .1525 .0950 .0188 .8416 
GDPCC $ mill 14034.3 5861.5 6150.6 30847.7 
 
Table 3 indicates the strong heterogeneity of the banks as measured by profit 
performance. Bank profitability within the GCC over this period varied from large 
losses to strong growth. The heterogeneity of the banks in the GCC is also underlined 
by the variability of $ assets. Other bank variables that highlight heterogeneity and 
structural differences is the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits and the ratio of 
off-balance sheet income to  total income. Banks liquid liabilities as a proportion of 
deposit liabilities vary from 99% to 4%, while off-balance sheet income as a proportion 
of total income varies from 2% to 84%. Country heterogeneity is indicated by the 
differences in $ GDP per capita and the ratio of population per branch.  
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4 The empirical results 
The modelling framework follows a two-stage strategy; first, to test for within country 
bank heterogeneity and second, to test for country heterogeneity against a pooled 
specification for the GCC as a whole. The modelling strategy involved tests for fixed 
effects versus pooled using the first approach described in Table 2 above. Table 4 
presents the results of a set of F tests. 
 
Table 4: Tests for Bank and Country Heterogeneity. H0: fixed effects = 0  
Country F test Probability  Decision 
Bahrain F(5,44) = 0.41 0.8419 Accept 
Kuwait F(6,52) = 6.68 0.0000 Reject 
Oman F(4,35) = 1.64 0.1862 Accept 
Qatar F(5,44) = 2.84 0.0263 Reject 
Saudi F(9,78) = 3.27 0.0020 Reject 
UAE F(17,116) = 3.30 0.0001 Reject 
Country FE F(5,464) = 1.57 0.1677 Accept 
 
The independent variables included all of the determining variables described in 
Table 2 above excluding the Islamic bank dummy SPECIALIZ for the within country 
bank heterogeneity tests9. The Islamic bank dummy variable was included in the 
country fixed effects model. The results of Table 4 in general reject bank homogeneity 
within each country (except for Bahrain and Oman) but do not reject across country 
homogeneity within the GCC as a whole. The conclusion of this exercise is to recognise 
                                                 
9 The Islamic bank dummy variable was perfectly collinear with individual banks within individual 
countries. 
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that there is bank heterogeneity but not country heterogeneity within the GCC treating 
each country as a pooled entity. 
In the remainder of this section we present the results for the models 1 and 2 in 
Table 5. The results for the determination of market structure (the fourth approach – 
model 3), are shown in Table 6, and Table 7 shows the results for the “Quiet Life 
Hypothesis”. 
Table 5:  ROA Fixed Effects for all GCC banks (1st and 2nd approaches); t statistics 
in parenthesis 
Model Bank Fixed 
Effects 
Bank Fixed 
Effects 
Bank FE  
(INST) 
Country Fixed 
Effects 
Country FE 
(INST) 
Intercept -.4922*** 
(-4.14) 
-.4941*** 
(-4.16) 
-.4213*** 
(-2.94) 
-.5390*** 
(-4.21) 
-.4059* 
(-1.84) 
Ln(GDPPC) .0224*** 
(4.27) 
.0229*** 
(4.42) 
.0179* 
(1.93) 
.0175*** 
(3.28) 
.0077* 
(1.90) 
CR3 .0614** 
(2.42) 
.0596** 
(2.38) 
.0676** 
(2.44) 
.0881*** 
(3.55) 
.0246** 
(2.22) 
MS -.0118 
(-0.48) 
- - - 
 
- 
Ln(ASSET) -.0036 
(-1.41) 
-.0039 
(-1.59) 
-.0026 
(-0.46) 
.0118** 
(2.41) 
.0059 
(1.58) 
CAPAST .1270*** 
(5.82) 
.1290*** 
(6.02) 
.1423*** 
(5.61) 
.1357*** 
(9.82) 
.1703*** 
(4.65) 
LOANAST .0253*** 
(3.77) 
.0254*** 
(3.79) 
-.0186 
(-0.39) 
.0282*** 
(5.87) 
.0636 
(1.57) 
TEXPTA -0.4379*** 
(-10.26) 
-.4380*** 
(-10.27) 
-.5019** 
(-2.31) 
-.4267*** 
(10.81) 
.1835 
(0.43) 
Ln(POPBRNCH) .0282*** 
(3.50) 
.0281***   
(3.50) 
.0263*** 
(3.04) 
.0316*** 
(3.70) 
.0239* 
(1.85) 
OBSTA .0182** 
(1.99) 
.0186**        
(2.06) 
.0065          
(0.46) 
.0246*** 
(3.30) 
.0442* 
(1.94) 
SPECIALIZ - - - -.0092***  
 (-4.64)  
-.0092** 
(-2.29) 
Te-EFF - .0138***      
(2.68) 
.0187**       
(2.52) 
.0103** 
(2.00) 
-.0061 
(-0.50) 
within R2    
H0: FE = 0   
0.2993   
F(51,419)=3.81***   
0.2989 
F(51,420)=3.88*** 
0.2218 
F(51,420)=3.44*** 
.3746 
 
F(5,465)=2.18* 
.2809 
 
F(5,465)=1.26 
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10% 
 
 
 Table 5 shows some representative results derived from the first and second approaches 
described in Table 2 above for all GCC countries’ banks. We present both the fixed 
effects model controlling for bank heterogeneity and the fixed effects model controlling 
for country heterogeneity. The first column includes concentration (CR3) and market 
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share (MS), but only CR3 is statistically significant. The lack of statistical significance 
of market share lends support to the SCP version of the market power hypothesis over 
the ES hypothesis or the RMP version. The second column excludes market share and 
controls for efficiency by including the non-parametric measure of technical 
efficiency10. Bank characteristics such as risk factors, financial strength, overhead 
expenses, and business diversification add to the explanation and also macro factors 
such as geographic diversification and GDP per capita have positive and significant 
effects. Column 3 re-estimates the model in column 2 for potential endogeneity in the 
regressors using instrumental variables. The loan-asset ratio and cost-asset ratio are 
treated as endogenous and the additional instruments are scale efficiency and total 
economy deposit growth11.  Column 4 presents a stripped down country fixed effects 
version of column 3 but including the dummy variable for identifying Islamic banks12 
and column 5 is the instrumental variables estimate version of column 4. 
The evidence presented here clearly supports the view that concentration is the 
principal structural determinant of profitability and not market share. But even 
controlling for efficiency and endogenous regressors as shown in columns 3 and 4, 
concentration remains positive and significant. It is also seen that allowing for 
concentration, the more technically efficient banks earn higher profits. Thus, the results 
support the conditions necessary for the SCP version of the market power hypothesis, 
that, in a more concentrated environment, banks have higher profits. Our results do not 
support the RMP hypothesis. 
                                                 
10 Although the estimate of scale efficiency is obtained independently of technical efficiency, its  
inclusion in regressions created problems of multi-collinearity and was excluded from the subsequent 
regressions.  
11 The Hausman specification test for systematic differences in the coefficients produced a chi square (9) 
of 1.32 p(.9982).  
12 The F statistic for the fixed effects is on the margin of the conventional level of significance 
prob(5.5%).   
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While the banking systems in GCC countries differ widely in terms of size and 
operation and commercial and Islamic banks have to deal with different environments, 
and different financial, legal and institutional conditions, we find that country 
differences are not as strong as bank differences.  
Table 6 shows a sample of regressions based on the fourth approach (in table 2). 
In these two regressions, market structure (concentration and market share) variables are 
regressed on the efficiency variables in order to test the ES hypotheses. Under these 
hypotheses, greater efficiency should be associated with a higher market share and 
concentration. The results of Table 5 which show a positive relationship between 
efficiency and performance can be interpreted as supportive evidence for the ES 
hypothesis.  
Table 6:  Determinants of market structure (concentration and market share) for all GCC banks 
(4th approach); t statistics in parenthesis 
CR3 CR3 MS MS 
Variable Bank FE Country FE Bank FE Country FE 
Intercept 
2.9478*** 
(16.05) 
3.027*** 
(15.34) 
.5528*** 
(2.92) 
.2256 
(1.19) 
TEFFIC 
-.0133 
(-1.38) 
-.0079 
(-0.85) 
.0077 
(0.77) 
.0847*** 
(3.67) 
Ln(GDPPC) 
-.0215** 
(-2.04) 
-.0621*** 
(-6.43) 
-.0403*** 
(-3.97) 
-.0984*** 
(-4.96) 
DEPSGROW 
.0507*** 
(3.31) 
.0573*** 
(3.50) 
.-  
- 
Ln(ASSET) 
-.0447** 
(-10.67) 
-.0027** 
(2.21) 
.0215*** 
(5.31) 
.0897*** 
(27.00) 
DDTTDEP 
-0.0274** 
(-2.01) - 
- - 
TEXPTA 
.1656** 
(2.02 
.2929*** 
(4.09) 
- .3688** 
(2.08) 
Ln(POPBRNCH) 
-.1906*** 
(-14.92) 
-.1895*** 
(-14.03) 
-.0228* 
(-1.74) 
. 
 
SPECIALZ 
- 
 
.0016 
(0.50) 
- 
 
-.0504*** 
(-6.21) 
OBSTA 
- 
 
- 
 
-.0519*** 
(-2.97) 
-.1463*** 
(-4.69) 
Significance of 
regression F(7,422)==56.9*** F(12,468)=1309.1*** 
F(5,424)=8.9*** F(11,469)=116.2*** 
H0: FE = 0 F(51,422)=203.1*** F(5,468)=1651.2*** F(51,424)=114.1*** F(5,463)=168.2*** 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. 
 
However, the results from Table 6 show that controlling for bank specific and 
macroeconomic effects, the regression coefficients from the CR3 regressions do not 
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support the ES hypothesis. In the concentration (CR3) regressions, the coefficients are 
negative but not statistically significant for technical efficiency. In the market share 
(MS) regressions, the sign on the TEFFIC coefficients are positive but significant for 
the country fixed effects model only.  
However, the positive and significant effect of the cost-asset ratio is suggestive 
of the QL hypothesis. Higher concentration or market share can induce lax cost control 
by bank mangers. Although statistically insignificant, a potential explanation for the 
negative relationship between technical efficiency and concentration is that banks with 
market power are less diligent in controlling costs. Thus costs and efficiency may be 
jointly determined. This is also consistent with the Hicks’ (1935) QL hypothesis. Indeed 
Berger and Hannan (1995) provide evidence suggesting that ‘quiet life’ effects in 
banking may be substantial. This suggests that the line of causation runs from structure 
to efficiency, rather than from efficiency to structure, as argued by proponents of the 
Efficient Structure Hypothesis. While the QL Hypothesis may also apply to scale 
efficiency, the focus is here is primarily on technical efficiency because it fits more 
closely with the concepts of lax management and/or expense-preference behaviour that 
raises costs. 
As suggested by Hicks (1935), the reduction in competitive pressure in 
concentrated markets may result in lessened effort by managers to maximise operating 
efficiency. Thus, in addition to the traditionally recognised higher prices and reduced 
output from market power, there may also be higher cost per unit of output in 
concentrated markets because of slack management.  
The basic hypothesis tested is that market power exercised by firms in 
concentrated markets allows them to avoid minimising costs without necessarily exiting 
the industry. Berger and Hannan (1998, p. 464) stated: “The reduced pressures to 
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minimise costs may result in lower costs efficiency for banks in concentrated markets 
through one or more of several mechanisms shirking by managers, the pursuit of 
objectives other than profit maximisation, political or other activities to defend or gain 
market power, or simple incompetence that is obscured by extra profits made available 
by the exercise of market power”. 
 
Table 7: QL Hypothesis, Dependent variable: Technical Efficiency; t values in 
parenthesis. 
Variable Bank Fixed Effects Country Fixed 
Effects 
Pooled 
 C 5.490*** 
(4.98) 
5.224*** 
(4.67) 
2.588*** 
(5.44) 
CR3 -.3139 
(-1.30) 
-.1648 
(-0.74) 
-.1285** 
(-2.43) 
Ln(GDPPC) -.1460*** 
(-3.02) 
-.1584*** 
(-3.35) 
-.0256 
(1.44) 
Ln(ASSET) -.0411* 
(-1.73) 
-.0220*** 
(-3.66) 
-.0214*** 
(-3.92) 
DDTTDEP -.0703 
(-1.02) 
-.0556* 
(-1.76) 
-.0550* 
(-1.82) 
TEXPTA 1.783*** 
(4.38) 
1.4504*** 
(4.11) 
1.5626*** 
(4.48) 
SPECIALZ - .0193 
(1.01) 
.0196 
(1.05) 
OBSTA -.1417* 
(-1.70) 
-.1296** 
(-2.19) 
-.1431** 
(-2.43) 
Ln(POPBRNCH) -.2947*** 
(-3.88) 
-.2733*** 
(-3.61 
-.1346*** 
(-3.72) 
Sig of regression F(7,422)=8.61*** F(13,467)=9.87*** F(8,472)=14.43*** 
H0: FE = 0 F(51,422)=1.95*** F(5,467)=2.27** - 
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant t the 5%, significant at the 10% 
 
Table 7 shows the results of the tests for the QL hypothesis treating the cost-asset ratio 
as endogenous. The results of table 7 enables us to test the causal relationship between 
efficiency and market structure variables predicted by the QL variant of the market 
power hypothesis which proposes a “reverse causation” from market structure to 
efficiency. A negative and statistically significant relation is indicative of the “quiet life 
effect”. Table 7 presents the bank fixed effects; country fixed effects and pooled 
estimation. Column 3 shows a significant negative relation between concentration and 
technical efficiency but the pooled specification is rejected on the conventional level of 
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significance. Columns 1 and 2 show the results for the bank fixed effects and the 
country fixed effects. We conclude that there is little evidence that banks in the more 
concentrated GCC markets exhibit lower technical efficiency for the period 1993-2002. 
This is in contrast to Berger and Hannan (1997, 1998), who find evidence that 
concentration (CR3) proxies market power and those banks with more market power are 
less diligent in controlling costs. Our results do not support the QL hypothesis and 
conclude that the empirical evidence supports the basic SCP version of the market 
power hypothesis that associates market concentration with profit performance.  
  
8 Conclusion 
The wave of horizontal mergers in banking has often been justified by 
participants and consultants as being based on cost savings from consolidations of back-
office operations and branching networks. The fact that banking mergers in overlapping 
markets have not generally been found to improve cost efficiency (see Berger and 
Humphrey (1992)) could conceivably result from the efficiency costs of the higher 
concentration as measured here. That is, a reduction in market pressure to minimise 
costs may offset the technological cost economies associated with the consolidations. 
Consideration of these efficiency costs in banking legislation and regulation may also 
be important, because so many regulatory issues involve changes in the degree of 
competition or market contestability. Examples are policies relating to geographic 
barriers to entry, limits on the issuing of bank charters, and the power of banks and 
other financial institutions to enter each other’s traditional lines of business (Berger and 
Hannan, 1998). In the context of GCC banking Murinde and Ryan (2003, p.15) give an 
indication of protection afforded domestic banks:  
Although foreign commercial banks were allowed to operate in Saudi Arabia before 1976, they 
were forced into partial or full nationalisation after 1976. Hence, in terms of the GATS, the 
banking market is closed to foreign banks. For example, no new licences have been issued since 
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1988. Moreover, state development banks are supported by huge subsidies and therefore operate 
on a non-competitive basis. Saudi banks seem to be the most profitable in the GCC in terms of 
return on average equity. However, published performance ratios do not take into account the 
subsidy element. 
 
 
As a result, an uncompetitive environment in concentrated markets may result in excess 
profit taking by domestic banks.  
This paper has analysed the relationship between market structure and bank 
performance in the GCC banking industry over the period 1993-2002. It has employed 
four hypotheses to test the relationship between efficiency, market structure and 
profitability. The voluminous empirical literature on this topic has typically not 
included independent measures of efficiency to control for efficiency and distinguish 
between the relative market power hypothesis and the efficient structure hypothesis. In 
contrast to previous research, we employ a non-parametric method of estimating 
efficiency rather than a parametric estimate. Consistent with the empirical findings in 
the banking literature, we find a positive relationship between firms’ profits and market 
structure. The inclusion of an efficiency measure provides support for the traditional 
SCP rather than the RMP hypothesis. We also find little support for the quiet life 
hypothesis of Hicks (1935). In conclusion, GCC bank behaviour was consistent with the 
tradition SCP hypothesis where market structure helps explain performance even in the 
presence of technical efficiency. 
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